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Abstract—Self-organising systems are a popular engineering
concept for designing decentralised autonomic computing sys-
tems. They are able to find solutions in complex and versatile
problem domains, but as they capture more complexity in their
own design, they are becoming less and less comprehensible
to their users (be they humans or intelligent agents). We
describe a design challenge that relates to usability theory
in general and in particular resembles an observation made
by Phoebe Senger, who noted that software agents tend to
become incomprehensible in their behaviour as they grow more
complex. In the manifestation of self-organising systems, the
problem is more urgent (since we find ourselves using them
more and more) and harder to solve at the same time (since
these systems are not centrally controlled). We describe the
problem domain and propose three system properties that
could be used as quality indicators in this regard: Stability,
Learnability and Engageability. We demonstrate their usage in
a simple model of dynamic pricing markets (e.g. the electricity
domain) and evaluate them in different ways.
Keywords-Artificial intelligence, Self-organizing control, Sys-
tem analysis and design, User centered design, Optimization
methods
I. INTRODUCTION
When computer systems become more complex, their
shortcomings in usability become clearer to their users.
Phoebe Sengers [1] pointed this tendency out when she made
clear how artificial agents resemble schizophrenic humans
in their behaviour, being “fragmented“ and “incomprehensi-
ble“. This has never been stated for self-organising systems,
but they exhibit the same problems and we find ourselves
using them more and more.
Many contemporary examples of complex, automated
computer systems who self-organise in a complex domain
can be found in traffic control - for motorways (e.g.
Smulders [2] describes the Dutch system of variable speed
signs), public transport (e.g. Gershenson and Pineda [3]
describe how buses can avoid the platooning effect if they
follow system-internal schedules rather than to wait for all
passengers to board) or urban traffic (e.g. Dusparic et al
[4] model the interplay of inner city control mechanisms
which optimise for private and public traffic in parallel). In
Economics, complex trading systems have become reality
and more are planned, for instance in deregulated electricity
markets [5]. In addition, many models exist for applications
in security/surveillance [6], e-health or e-government [7].
We note that many of these systems are hybrids in that they
employ both artificial and human agents. We also make the
same assumption about (future) users: automated systems
should be comprehensible to external automated agents.
Many researchers seem to jump from the fact that self-
organising systems support emergent behaviour to the con-
clusion that they are inherently easier to interact with, since
they can adjust themselves to many circumstances. On the
contrary, properties brought about by complex behaviour are
hiding the systems inner states by abstraction, thus making
the interaction problem even harder to solve than for single
agents. To our best knowledge, this problem has not yet been
described in the literature.
While similar shortcomings have been identified by other
authors (e.g. [4], [8], [9], [10], [11]), our modelling of this
problem reflects systems which do not lend themselves to
semantic or game theoretic descriptions of all interactions.
We take a signal processing approach, where we are inter-
ested in the interpretation of the systems output by its users.
Our approach considers similar settings as Decision The-
ory, being concerned with the question how better decision
making can be enabled for actors in complex, uncertain
and inter-temporal environments. We are not interested in
usability concepts tailored specifically to humans (e.g. recent
HCI approaches [12]), but rather use simple statistic analyses
which could be performed by either humans or software. In
a similar approach, Holzer et al [13] model self-organising
systems as a multigraph and measure two system properties
(autonomy and emergence) via the entropy over signals on
the graph edges. We do not require a complete system model,
as we are only interested in the edge between the system and
a user.
In system design, current research focuses almost exclu-
sively on internal performance objectives or the possible
utilities achievable for users, each on its own. We propose
comprehensibility as a third perspective, asking to what
extent a system is dependable, learnable and engageable. A
comprehensible system reduces the overhead costs that arise
by using it and makes easier introduction and deployment
possible.
The contributions of this work are to motivate why
designing comprehensible self-organising systems is an es-
pecially hard task in the online, multi-user case, which we
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do in Section II, and to propose three system properties
(as perceived by its users) that could be used as quality
indicators for comprehensibility: Stability, Learnability and
Engageability, which we review in Section III. In section
IV, we model a simple example system to demonstrate how
these indicators could be modelled and evaluated in practice.
Section V concludes and Section VI discusses future work.
II. ONLINE, MULTI-USER, SELF-ORGANISING SYSTEMS
A. Definition
In this work, we treat self-organisation as an engineering
concept, which fits well into the domain of autonomic
computing [14]. Here, self-organisation can be seen as a
process which enables a system to modify its organisation
in case of changes in the environment, without explicit
external commands. Instead, agents act inside of the system
considering internal states, rules and constraints [15]. The
reorganisation will put the system in a new state. This state
can be vastly different from the previous state - the state
transition is considered an appropriate response if it brings
the system back to some internal performance objective.
In the sense of Von Foerster [16], the environment as an
external, contingent actor is crucial to the operation of any
self-organising system. Here, we are especially interested in
an environment consisting of the systems users and in their
ability to interact with the system. This relates to research
in open systems. De Alfaro [8] defines an open system as “a
system whose behavior is jointly determined by its internal
structure, and by the input it receives from the environment.”
The self-organising systems that are proposed in most
of the literature behave to their environment much like
distributed systems in that they abstract over their internal
states, hiding them from their users. A distributed system,
by design, provides its users a system view on itself which
abstracts over several aspects of its distribution (e.g. access,
location or failure)[17]. Thus, the user does not need to care
which parts of the system he is interacting with - to him,
the system is perceived as one single opponent.
We consider here self-organising systems that have mul-
tiple users, who are interested in states of the system at
different time points (in its online behaviour) from distinct
point of views. An example of an offline, single-user self-
organising system is a Swarm within a Particle Swarm
Optimisation [18]. There is only one user of such a system,
who is only interested in one state at one time: the best
position when the optimisation has stopped. Online multi-
user systems, on the other hand, present several states to the
outside world. Examples of multi-user systems are traffic
regulation systems and markets. Figure 1 illustrates how
design (’control’) and interests in system states (’read’) differ
in both cases. In fact, the designer of a multi-user system
faces a multi-objective optimisation problem as soon as the
objectives of the users do not align with his (optimisation)
objectives.
(a) Particle Swarm optimisation
(b) Traffic Control Scenario
Figure 1. Examples for an offline, single-user system and an online multi-
user system
In this paper, we demonstrate our ideas with a sim-
ple market model. Markets fit our case as they are often
described as self-organising systems (e.g. [19], [20]), and
consist of multiple autonomous actors, who influence supply
and demand via their actions over time [21]. In our model,
consumers act as the users, from whose point of view we
will evaluate the proposed indicators.
B. Problem Statement
The problem we outline here is rooted in the fact that a
multi-user self-organising system is not a single opponent to
its users. By definition, its agents act autonomously and not
on behalf of a single, central opponent, who would ensure
a stable behaviour that would be dependable or learnable.
These systems abstract over their internal states, meaning
that the causal connection between its outputs and inner
states is hidden or too complex to infer. Users will find it
hard to comprehend and thus depend on such systems. It has
in fact been noted that human users tend to refer to complex
self-organising systems in their language as single actors. In
[22], Morris et al describe how using the agent metaphor
(e.g. “the Nasdaq climbed”) over the object metaphor (“the
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Nasdaq bounced back”) changes the users interpretation of
the systems response. For lack of a better clue to the inner
workings of the system, users are employing Occam’s Razor
by rationalising the system’s response with a simple, but
inaccurate interpretation. This may be a serious source for
misunderstandings.
In addition to being dependable and learnable, several
multi-user system designs hope for the user’s active partic-
ipation. This can be seen in partly liberalised markets (e.g.
electricity markets), where hopes are high to create open
frameworks, such that many players are able to access the
market and drive it towards efficiency. The success of such
an open system might partly depend on its engageability,
the extent to which users are able to recognise the effect of
their actions in the interaction with the system. To describe
unengeaging user-system relations, Luhmann [23] suggests
to use the term ’confidence’ rather than the term ’trust’,
because trust “requires a previous engagement on your part“.
Users in a confidence relation “react to disappointment by
external attribution“ rather than to acknowledge their own
contribution to the situation.
Senger [24] introduces the concept of comprehensible
agents, who are not only supporting a function but are also
usable in that they are comprehensible to its users. We argue
that this concept needs to find its way into the design of self-
organising systems, i.e. we are in need of comprehensible
systems. This holds especially for systems whose users have
little choice but to use them, as is for instance the case with
traffic control systems and often for markets.
Any hidden complexity of current self-organising systems
can possibly make its outputs and behaviours incomprehen-
sible to its users. The hurdles which a design for compre-
hensibility would need to overcome lie at the heart of the
concept of self-organisation: Those systems are designed to
deal with very complex problems, thus their internal states
can often not be reduced to simple concepts. Any constraints
on state transitions might hinder the system in reacting
flexible and its quest for optimising internal performance
objectives. On the other hand, abstracting inner states and
objectives away from users can often be a problem rather
than a welcome feature for them. To feed the users desire
to depend on, learn to use and engage with the system,
some of these abstractions should be reconsidered, which
is a challenging engineering problem.
Relations to Market Theory: There is a well-established
discussion about hidden complexity in market theory: The
efficient-market hypothesis claims that the prices in a market
reflect the true value of products, i.e. all information about
them. There is growing evidence against the hypothesis in its
strong form (e.g. [25]), which claims that prices reflect even
non-public insider information. Returning to our discussion
of abstraction above, this would mean that markets abstract
over their internal states. Hence, abstraction towards users
must be seen as reducing this kind of informative efficiency:
Pagano and Roell [26] investigate the effect of abstraction on
liquidity and conclude “that if policy makers want to reduce
trading costs for uninformed traders, they should publicly
disseminate order flow information as promptly as possible”.
Their model predictions “may also help to understand why
lately dealer markets are under increasing pressure from the
more transparent automated auction systems.”
We stated that designing for both complexity and compre-
hensibility constitutes a trade-off situation. This is illustrated
by the concept of “Dynamic Efficiency” (e.g. [27]), denoting
how well a market policy prepares its participants for
possible future states, rather than (statically) optimising the
present. In this context, Potts [28] argues that some sufficient
amount of structural complexity is needed in a system to
enable it to arrive at viable solutions which enable both
adaptability to a current state and being prepared for change.
In our view, complexity alone will hardly be sufficient. We
think it is an important research question how (market)
systems can contain more complexity while still enabling
informed and cost-effective decision making for their users.
III. QUALITY INDICATORS
We propose three quality indicators and give some first
approaches to measuring them. They all are an interpretation
of the systems signals towards the user and use the concept
of utility [29] to quantify this interpretation in different
states. Thus, we use the term ’received utility’ to denote how
the systems output is interpreted by the user and the term
’action’ to denote the users behaviour towards the system.
We believe that these indicators make a contribution
towards more comprehensible self-organising systems, in
that they constitute a universal set of interests inherent to
most users who are interested in reducing their overhead
costs, be they human or automated, which is commonly
not captured by objective measures such as price. If they
are used in system design, the user utility in these systems
can become more comparable, at least the part which is
influenced by the systems behaviour.
A. Stability
One aspect of comprehensibility is Stability. We claim
here that a system with a low variance in transitions between
received utilities can be more reliable to the user and thus
the resources needed to use it can be reduced (or be put
to use less frequently). Of course, Stability works against
dynamicity, scalability and other desirable attributes of self-
organising systems. It is hard to achieve Stability in those
systems because they react to the dynamics of different
influences - the received utilities have to be interpreted in the
context of the environment. Often, the environment consists
of other autonomous system-agents. If a self-organising
system is decentralised, then another difficulty is that the
system responds with utilities via several of its agents whose
inner states might not be coherent. Cognitive Psychologists
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have developed relational complexity theory to describe this
problem. According to relational complexity theory [30], the
processing load of a cognitive task is determined by the
complexity of the relations that must be processed in a given
step.
A simple approach to measuring Stability could be done
via a time series of measured data points, e.g. the price in
a market system with dynamic pricing. The variance in this
series is a simple indicator of Stability as in Equation 1:
sX =
√√√√ 1
N − 1
N∑
i=1
(xi − x¯)
2
(1)
where N is the number of received utilities, xi is an indi-
vidual utility received by the agent and x is the population
mean over all received utilities. Note that sX is ∈ [0, 1].
B. Learnability
The Learnability of a system is an established quality
indicator in software quality evaluation [31]. To generalise
this problem for all self-organising systems, we propose that
the Learnability of a self-organising system indicates how
well the likelihood of transitions between received utilities
can be learned by a user. For this, additionally available
local information might be helpful. A user can observe states
in the systems environment (including his own) or get to
know the intentions (i.e. inner optimisation objectives) of the
system and to some extent learn why a new received utility
supports these. Thus, we might also ask: How disentangled
is a received utility from any users’ local information?
Learnability does not come naturally to self-organising
systems because of their inherent abstraction over complex-
ity we discussed above. System agents do not expose all
information available to them. In the decentralised case, they
might even be restricted to giving only a partial account of
the systems state from their viewpoint. For example, when
a traffic-sign agent A on a Dutch motorway needs to signal
a lower speed limit, this is due to congestions in another
part of the system, but exact information about all problems
in the system is not available at the agents location. And
even if it were available, the response at A came about by
complex interactions - it might even be part of an emergent
high-level response and as such not easily reducible.
We present here the most simple approach to Learnability:
To measure how hard it would be for the user to forecast
utilities she receives from the system, given only other
contextual information she has. For stable systems, (i.e. with
low variance in received utilities) forecasting is not hard,
but even with high variance, a user might be able to infer
received utilities when she is given more information than
just the received utilities themselves. If a user can observe a
part of the environment (at the very least, each user knows
about her own actions), she is able to see and learn possible
correlations between changes in it and the received utilities.
For example, the traffic-sign agent at location A could
increase Learnability by telling slowed-down drivers about
the reason he does so: maybe an average congestion index
he derives from signals received from agents at location B,
C and D. A running sample correlation coefficient would be
computed like Equation 2:
rXY =
1
N − 1
N∑
i=1
(
xi − x¯
sX
)(
yi − y¯
sY
) (2)
where N is the number of pairs of system output xi and
local information yi. Note that rXY is ∈ [−1, 1], where 0
means no correlation.
From the user’s perspective, the Learnability problem
resembles the General Game Playing Challenge ([11], [32]),
where artificial agents have to play a game of which they
are told the rules only when the game begins: They are not
prepared to behave optimal (regarding their own utilities)
in the realm of the system. An even harder case is when
even the rules are unknown to the player - a situation which
Levinson [33] calls the ’blind player’. Note that even when
rules are accessible, blind players can be found in many
domains, when they are not willing or interested enough to
put in effort to learn the rules, for example in security or
surveillance scenarios.
C. Engageability
Many claims exist that interaction patterns with users
should matter. For self-organising systems, we can think of
two reasons in favour of this:
1) Whenever the actions of users matter to the system
context, the system design should give users incen-
tives to make it individually rational [29] to work
towards the systems objectives. In other words, the
self-organising system should provide a conclusive
relation between user actions and received utility,
encouraging actions from the user which help the
system and discouraging those that do not.
2) However, the system design should not only care about
quality of user actions, but also quantity. When users
feel they cannot do what they want or that their actions
do not have an effect, they are likely to decrease their
usage of the system or the efforts to engage.
If the systems user model is detailed enough and it engages
the user with the fitting utilities, the user will notice an
effect of a change in response to her actions. But this is
hard to achieve, partly because of the abstraction of inner
complexity, but also especially in systems with many users.
For example, the presence of the driver on any dutch mo-
torway at rush hour matters, but often only in infinitesimal
amounts.
For the purposes of this work, we will again take the most
simple view we can take to make a first approach to the this
indicator. Engageability measures how much a change in
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user behaviour (her actions towards the system) a matters
to the utility u received from the system in response. For
example, consider a market system that engages a user by
letting her know about a price peak in advance, suggesting
to lower demand (the systems objective being here to lower
overall demand). The amount of demand the user refrains
from would be the action, an immediate price reduction
(per unit) the received utility effect (in fact, this is how our
example will proceed in Section IV). The indicator measures
the ratio of changes in user action to effects in received
utility:
%4a/%4u
In practice, it might make sense to consider specific ranges
of time. Let T be a set of time points t at which the user
had opportunity to perform a change in his action towards
the system at (e.g. speed, usage amounts, price bids). We
assume a utility effect ut ∈ [0, 1] to every at ∈ [0, 1] (where
in both cases 0 denotes no change or effect and 1 denotes
the most complete change or effect possible), such that for
every considered time point set T , we can calculate the
rate of change in actions and the received utility effects
for each time step t in T . If there exist timing difficulties
in connecting utilities to actions, it might make sense to
compare the sum of actions to net utility achieved over the
course of a longer time period. We also assume that for both
actions and utilities base values ab and ub are known, so we
can compare the deviations (if no base value is known, one
could simply take zero or the last value). Thus, a possible
measure (in appropriate settings) could be:
∑T
t=1 d
T−t((ut − ub)− (at − ab))
T
(3)
where d ∈ [0, 1] denotes a discounting factor, which can
discount older differences stronger than more recent ones.
Engageability gives us values ∈ [−1, 1], much as the
correlation coefficient does, which we used for Learnability.
If Engageability is zero, the received utility effect from
the system matches the change in action by the user. If
Engageability is lesser than zero, the utility effect does not
match the change in action and if it is bigger than zero, the
utility effect is even larger than the change in action. To
rule out that randomly returned utilities average to zero, one
should consider whether the variance in single Engagement
indices is not too high.
D. Evaluation
In such complex environments as the domains in which
self-organising systems are used, stochastic and parame-
terised simulations are a meaningful approach to study the
different configurations a system might find itself in and
then evaluate indicators based on the collected data. In the
next section, we will put forward an example market system
and simulate several scenarios in it. We will then use three
methods to evaluate our indicators:
• It is important to see how the indicators respond
to different system configurations. Which changes in
parameter values of the system configuration increase
or decrease them?
• For the comparison of system designs in multi-objective
optimisation problems like these, pareto fronts between
the three indicators can be a meaningful tool to study
how much the indicators compete. Pareto fronts allow
us to state if an indicator could be increased under
a different configuration without decreasing another
indicator (i.e. the new configuration pareto-dominates
the current one).
• Not every user is the same - for a meaningful analysis,
one should also look at distinct parts of the user
population to see if the indicators behave differently
to them.
Keep in mind that all indicators we propose denote a
perceived value, from the users perspective. Their relevancy
might differ, given the application or design situation. They
can become less clear by noise and even influence each
other (e.g. Stability decreases Engageability, as we will
demonstrate later). In addition, the importance users assign
to them are subjective and will vary between users.
IV. EXAMPLE
A. Model
To exemplify the indicators we proposed in the last sec-
tion, we model a simple market example (see Figure 2a for
illustration), where consumers consume a good continuously
(e.g. electricity, but also water, communication services)
and pay for it according to retail contracts. A supplier and
a retailer self-organise dynamic pricing. Interestingly, the
users of this system also constitute a significant part of
the environment for other users via their behaviour. We
will come back to this in the analysis. Note that in a full-
fledged market model, we would find several retailer agents
who would influence each other, rendering the situation far
more complex. We could of course also add suppliers with
different cost curves.
C consumers each consume an amount of the good
dc,h ∈ [0, 100] in 24 (hourly) intervals h. The typical
demand profile over the course of one day is shown in
Figure 2b, with two prominent spikes, one in the morning
and one in the evening. We vary the demand of each
consumer c in every hour h by a random amount ∈ [0, 15].
The system consists of a retailer agent and a production
agent. The retailer agent has contracts with the local con-
sumers. To match demand for the current hour, he buys the
needed amount of the good from the producer - for a supply
price psh per unit ∈ [0, 1]. The supply price reacts logarith-
mically to changes in average demand (see Figure 2c). Thus,
it has high marginal prices when consumption is high and
we write psh short for p
s
h(
dC,h
C
), where dC,h =
∑C
c=0 dc,h.
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Figure 3. Flexible vs Inflexible consumer scenario
Algorithm 1 Demand negotiations
while h < runtime do
All consumers c announce their demand dc,h
Supplier calculates psh
Retailer calculates prc,h and announces results to all c
for all c ∈ C do
if c is flexible and prc,h > bc then
c delays 40% of dc,h to the night
end if
end for
Supplier calculates psh
Retailer calculates prc,h and bills all c
h ← h + 1
end while
Figures 3c and 3d show the costs for consumer and retailer,
respectively. We first observe that flexibility in demand pays
off for the consumer. His cost curve is much smoother and
less steep. Note that this is even the case when he does not
profit from the retail price being limited by varc, as does
the inflexible consumer in this case. His spiking demand
behaviour is not only more costly to him, but also for the
retailer.
B. Measuring Indicators
We will now vary two important variables in our sys-
tem and its environment and observe how this affects the
indicators we proposed. We run several simulations with
combinatorial experiment design in order to demonstrate the
quality indicators we offered in Section III.
The retailer agent can hide some of the risk from the con-
sumers, which is in our case the risk of supply price spikes.
We modelled this by a maximal retail price deviation in
contracts. We will now vary this maximal deviation devc ∈
[0.0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4]. An important (and unobservable) part
of the environment are other consumers. Are they flexible
and thus good for supply prices or not? To study effects of
this part of the system environment, we vary the ratio of
flexible consumers Cf ∈ [0.04, 0.25, 0.5, 0.74, 0.958], such
that there are 1, 6, 12, 18 and 23 flexible consumers present,
out of 24. We thus use 5 ∗ 5 = 25 settings. The model runs
for 120 days and we conduct 10 runs per setting.
In our simple market example, a consumer has not much
information at hand. He knows his personal retail price prc,h
and he knows his own demand profile. In addition, he can
observe how much the system lowers the retail price when
he changes his demand profile. We always look at a time
window over the last 24 hours.
To measure Stability, we consider the normalised re-
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pareto fronts
tail prices consumers paid (per unit). This tells us how
much fluctuation in prices is observed by a consumer. For
Learnability, we correlate the normalised demand profile of
consumers (before the flexible consumers delay parts of their
demand) with the normalised announced retail prices that are
based on them. This tells us how well the individual demand
profile of a consumer c predicts retail price announcements
he gets. For Engageability, the delays in demand which
flexible consumers perform are compared to the reduction
in retail price they achieve by this. This tells us about the
utility effect a flexible consumer can achieve for himself via
his actions. We compare deviations to known default states
(original demand, original retail price), with T = 24 and
d = 1 (we do not discount).
C. Results
1) System configuration analysis: Figures 4a, 4b and 4c
show the outcome for all three indicators when the two vari-
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ables are changing. In Figure 4a, we see that the significant
influence on Stability is devc. It is highest when devc = 0.0.
Retail prices are allowed to fluctuate by demand when
devc is increased and thus the perceived Stability decreases.
Learnability, in turn, is lowest when devC is low. When
prices do not respond to changes in demand, they do not
make sense to the consumers. Thus, Learnability increases
with devc, and interestingly, this increase is considerably
stronger when Cf is lower. This is due to flexible consumers
shifting demand to the night. Less sharper spikes mean that
the retail base price bc is surpassed less often and less
far, which leads to lesser correlations between demand and
retail price. Engageability is highest when all consumers are
flexible and the maximum retail price deviation is high and
thus allows them to save money by delaying their demand: as
the retailer will treat all consumers the same, the few flexible
consumers will still suffer when the majority is inflexible.
Note that −0.4 is the baseline for this indicator, as the delay
amount is 0.4 ∗ dc,h.
2) Pareto front analysis: In order to make a pareto
front analysis, we plotted all indicators against each other.
Figures 4e and 4f plot Engageability versus Stability and
Stability versus Learnability, respectively. In both plots, it
is desirable to move to the right (on the x-axis) and to the
top (on the y-axis). We see that between these indicators a
pareto front can easily be spotted. Experiments with much
more variable configurations and careful exploration of the
indicator space could produce more meaningful results, but
this will suffice for this demonstration. A planner of our
example market could make use of these trade-offs for
design decisions.
3) Inner-usergroup analysis: We now look at the flexible
and inflexible consumers distinctively. We are interested in
how much the indicators differ among them and how much
they change in relation to the prevalence of one group to
the other. We fixed devC = −0.4. Figure 4d shows the
only comparison with significant results: each user group
perceives the highest Learnability when they are among
consumers that behave just like them. This is again a direct
consequence of the retailers method of distributing his cost
among all consumers (if possible), without regard to their
contribution in demand delay. Interestingly, both graphs level
off after more than 80% of the consumers are flexible. Note
that this significant distinction would not become visible
when measuring only utility, as one lonely flexible consumer
would still suffer from high average supply prices. Our
proposed indicators make this clear.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have described a design challenge for
self-organising systems, stating that the increasing complex-
ity these systems are able to capture leads to decreasing
comprehensibility of its behaviour to its users. We describe
the kind of systems for which this problem arises and
offer three quality indicators: Stability, Learnability and
Engagement. We propose ways of computing them using
basic statistics and conduct a simple study in a retail market
model in order to demonstrate their evaluation. We analyse
the results by comparing the outcome regarding various
system configurations, plot pareto fronts and study how the
indicators behave to different groups of users. We believe
to have sufficiently motivated and shown in the results of
our example (see Section IV-C) that these indicators are
useful tools for planners of multi-user, online self-organising
systems in order to find the best design trade-offs with
respect to comprehensibility.
VI. FUTURE WORK
The calculations of indicators we proposed are far from
being optimal for every situation. For Learnability, agents
could actually try to predict future system behaviour. They
could use model selection over the results of a posteriori
machine learning technique, for instance Bayesian Learning
or Gaussian Processes. It would also be interesting for
some domains to measure the minimal description length
or entropy [13] of the systems responses to rate its Learn-
ability. For Engageability, there are possible pitfalls worth
studying. We already mentioned timing issues in comparing
actions and received utilities. In addition, the interpretation
of received utilities might be tricky (especially when dealing
with human users). For instance, in the city of New York,
pedestrian crossing buttons perform no actual function any
more for decades, but many argue that they still raise
Engageability for the pedestrians due to the placebo effect
[34] (though they certainly do not facilitate Learnability).
Overall, the trade-off between system goals and the dis-
cussed indicators is worthy of more discussion (e.g. Stability
most likely compromises adaptability). But this is not neces-
sarily a one-way street. In more intricate market models, one
could study if optimising towards these indicators actually
makes a market more dynamically efficient [27] when faced
with long-term change, as they empower users to adapt.
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